Us Intelligence Sharing Agreements

In order to avoid the mis-treatment of information provided by the intelligence services, states that receive information must have access to it, use it, analyze it and exchange information, duties of care. In particular, States must be required to analyse the accuracy or verifiability of the information received before responding to it and to ensure that the agencies with which the information is shared do not result in a negative human rights record. During the Vietnam War, Australian and New Zealand operators in the Asia-Pacific region worked directly to support the United States, while GCHQ operators stationed in the (then) British colony of Hong Kong were tasked with monitoring North Vietnamese air defence networks. [18] [19] During the Falklands War, the British received information from their FVEY allies such as Australia and third parties such as Norway and France. [20] [21] After the Gulf War, an ASIS technician was deployed by the SIS to harass Kuwaiti government offices. [21] As Shorrock notes, “many of the companies that dominate the intelligence industry today have started by providing technical services and products to the intelligence community.” The popular view is therefore that the public-private partnerships of the 1950s and 1960s were essentially technological in nature, namely to facilitate the development of new surveillance capabilities. It is therefore expected that the Industrial Safety Annex will limit the scope of contractor access to information strictly necessary to carry out these technical tasks. However, in reality, the schedule does not provide for such a limitation on the nature of information that can be shared with contractors. On the contrary, the appendix includes the transmission of “classified information in all its forms, whether oral, visual or in the form of material,” and defines the material as “anything independent of its physical character or composition, including” documents, writings, maps and letters.

In addition, the schedule does not set criteria for determining what secret service activities can be outsourced, whether they can be outsourced to foreign contractors, and under what circumstances. Much of today`s literature focuses on the relationship between U.S. intelligence agencies and U.S. companies, but very little is known about U.S. outsourcing.